













Firms who sell a regional or specialty product often share a common or collective 
reputation, which is based on the group's aggregate quality.  The dynamic problem of 
collective reputation is similar to the natural resource extraction problems.  Therefore, for 
the analysis of this particular problem, we use differential games.  If there is unrestricted 
access to a common property resource (the reputation stock), agents perceive its shadow 
value to be zero and extract too rapidly; i.e, they all “cheat” on quality, “milking” the 
rents generated by the existence of the resource (reputation stock).  We show that when 
there exists a collective product reputation without firm traceability, the firms will extract 
too much from the stock of reputation.  A firm is said to “extract” reputation from the 
reputation stock when it sells low-quality products at high prices given by the high past 
levels of quality.  The firm builds on the group's reputation when it provides a product 
with a quality level which is higher than the expected level of quality.  The results from 
this work support minimum quality standards for producer groups and regional and 
specialty products.   This is in contrast to the findings of previous work.  Finally, the 
implications of these results are discussed as they relate to the case study of Washington 
apples.  
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Collective Reputation and Quality 
 
1.  Introduction 
High quality, seasonal, authentic, and local food products have become a more important 
part of consumer purchases in recent years.  Producers have responded by marketing food 
products that come from specific geographic areas. The recent food safety scares in 
Europe have added to the demand for origin-specific foods.  This trend in consumers' 
preferences has led the European Union (EU) to introduce protected designations of 
origin labels and protected geographical identification labels, which provide protection of 
food names on a geographical or traditional basis, ranging from Parmesan cheese to such 
lesser-known items as Galician veal.  In the United States, there are popular state 
products which carry labels such as: Washington apples, Idaho potatoes, and Florida 
Citrus.   
  One of the elements that dictate the success of specialty or local products is the 
collective reputation of the product.  When the collective reputation of the product is 
good, the designation will be a powerful tool to signal quality.  Tirole (1996) modeled the 
idea of collective reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations.  In Tirole's model, 
the individual firm's past behavior is unknown to the consumer, so the consumer uses the 
past behavior of the member’s group to predict the individual firm's future behavior.   
The concept of collective reputation is important for many food products, where 
the individual producers are not known directly by the consumer.  The consumer relies on 
the image of the cooperative or consortia that guarantees and promotes the particular 
product.  Landon and Smith (1997, 1998) find that reputation is a significant factor in 
determining price premia for Bordeaux wine creates a price premium, and Quagrainie,   3
McCluskey, and Loureiro (2003) find that a common reputation exists for Washington 
apples. 
In this paper, the reputation of the product is assumed to be similar to a common 
property resource, which is exclusive to the group of firms that are able to use the group 
label.  In the spirit of Tirole’s collective reputation, it is assumed that the firms in the 
group share a common reputation, which is based on the group's aggregate quality.  Since 
reputation is a dynamic concept, we can apply tools from natural resource modeling.   
The dynamic problem of collective reputation is similar to the common property natural 
resource extraction problem studied by Levhari and Mirman (1980) and many others.   
As Karp (1992) points out, if there were unrestricted access to a natural resource 
(the reputation stock), agents perceive its shadow value to be zero and extract too rapidly; 
i.e, all “cheat” on quality, “milking” the rents generated by the existence of the resource 
(reputation stock).  However, when access is restricted to a finite number of firms, 
additional dynamics may exist.  We will show that for markets of quality, if there is no 
monitoring agent who controls the quality level, and given the asymmetric information 
situation between firms, all firms will extract from the stock of reputation.  The stock of 
reputation at time t, may increase or decrease depending on the “extractions” or 
“increments” on the reputation stock.  A firm is said to “extract” reputation from the 
reputation stock at time t when it sells low-quality products at high prices given by the 
high past levels of quality.  The firm builds on the group's reputation when it provides a 
product with a quality level which is higher than the expected level of quality.  
For the analysis of this particular problem, we use differential games.  Following 
the standard game theoretic-optimal control setup, when choosing his or her strategy,   4
each player is aware of the other players and how the other players' choices of their 
control variables affects his or her payoff.  That is, all players choose their control 
variables simultaneously.  Each player knows the others' strategies.  When there is no 
incentive for any of the players to revise his or her choice of control variable, then the 
choices are said to be in equilibrium.   
We will use feedback strategies to obtain an equilibrium rather than open-loop 
strategies.  In open loop strategies the players commit to his entire sequence of actions 
throughout time at the outset of the game.  This condition is rarely met in the real word, 
but because of their simplicity this types of strategies are frequently used.  A more 
realistic way of modeling the agent’s behavior is to suppose that he or she can change his 
or her behavior at each point of time on the basis of the state of the system.  This is 
achieved by the feedback strategies.  Thus, a feedback strategy allows the player to 
choose the best response in every sub-game.  Consequently, a feedback strategy is sub-
game perfect (Kamien and Schwartz, 1993). 
  The paper proceeds as follows: We provide a brief literature review of previous 
related studies, followed by a presentation and analysis of the theoretical model using 
differential games.  Next we provide a discussion of the Washington apple industry in 
light of our analytical findings.  Finally, conclusions and policy implications are 
presented. 
 
2. Related  Literature 
There is an extensive theoretical literature on reputation issues
1.  Shapiro (1983) shows 
theoretically that price premiums are necessary for producers to invest in quality and   5
reputation.  When the collective reputation (Tirole, 1996) of a product is good, the 
product's label will be a powerful tool to signal quality.  
Noe and Rebello (1995) consider competition between producer groups when 
consumers prefer costly “ethical” production technologies, which result in final products 
that have credence attributes.
2  The tradeoff between cost savings versus individual 
reputations within the producer group and ethical considerations determine the trajectory 
of group adherence to the production standards.  They find that social pressures from 
members of the group may induce producers to adopt the preferred technology.  Although 
related to the current paper, Noe and Rebello model the producer’s utility, which includes 
preferences for ethical technology and social pressures within the producer group. 
Zago (1999) uses an agency theory approach to analyze the interaction of hidden 
information and the democratic process and the quality choices of a group of 
heterogeneous producers who are members of a producer organization that has a 
reputation for quality.  Each producer has hidden information about his/her type.  The 
producer organization has perfect information about each producer’s quality level and 
can ensure that the payment to producers will be a function of quality provided.   
 
3.   Model  
We assume there are N identical firms that produce a specialty product.  Each of the firms 
is risk neutral and maximizes profits.  The price they receive for their specialty product is 
a function of their collective reputation, and costs are a function of quantity and quality 
produced.  We assume that collective reputation evolves as a Markovian process of past 
reputation and the present quality produced.  In order to focus on the firm's quality   6
decision, we assume that each firm produces a fixed quantity in each period and, for 
simplicity, the quantity produced is assumed to be one unit.  We will assume that, for an 
N firm industry, each firm chooses quality to maximize the following equation 
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where R is the collective reputation, and q is the firm quality choice.  These values are 
normalized so that they are in the same units.  Price is denoted as p and costs are denoted 
as c.  Since each firm maximizes profits subject to the state equation for collective 
reputation, the current value Hamiltonian for each firm’is, 
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where  i λ represents the shadow price that also take into account the discount factor.   
  The first order conditions of the current value Hamiltonian for the differential game are 
as follows: 
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Given that the firms are identical, then qi = q for all i, and there is a single state variable, 
the system of differential equations is given by (Mehlman), 
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Setting R  and q  equal to zero, we obtain the following isoclines, 
(7)                     R q =  
and 
(8)      ()( )() '1 ' p Rr c q N =+ . 
Although q is ambiguous from equation (8), if we assume a structural form we can solve 
for q explicitly.  In our model, we will assume price is log function and cost exponential 
increases with quality so that 
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where α and β are positive constants.  From equation (6) this yields, 

















Since the determinant of the Jacobian matrix is negative, the differential equations result 
in a saddle point equilibrium.  If we take the implicit derivative of q with respect to N at 
the equilibrium point we get,   8












Since all of the parameters are positive, this expression has a negative value.  This 
implies that as the number of firms increases, the quality decreases.  Therefore, firms are 
free-riding, and the industry is not maximizing profits.  Figure 1 shows the phase diagram 
with equilibria for both the monopoly and duopoly.  
This model has implications for enforceable minimum quality standards for 
producer groups, regional and specialty products.   Our conclusions with collective 
reputations are different from previous work that does not consider collective reputations.  
Bockstael (1984) concludes that minimum quality standards can not increase social 
welfare nor do they increase producer returns.  Bockstael argues that minimum quality 
standards may be a more politically acceptable method to limit the quantity of a good, 
thereby giving rents to many firms in the industry.  Her assumption is that consumers 
know the quality of each good, before it is purchased.  Our paper implies that if 
reputation is collective, then minimum quality standards are Pareto improving. 
 
4.  The Case of Washington Apples  
The State of Washington benefits from the reputation that its producers grow high quality 
apples (Quagrainie, McCluskey, and Loureiro, 2003).  In recent years, however, there 
have been industry concerns regarding the declining “eating” quality of Washington Red 
Delicious apples.  One would expect this to have a negative effect on the reputation of 
Washington apples and consequently on demand.  We present the case of Washington 
apples in light of the results of the analytical model.  We discuss how individual 
producers’ incentives are not aligned with the collective group and discuss findings of   9
declining reputation.  
The Northwest apple is undergoing a period of economic crisis with many 
growers teetering at the brink of bankruptcy.  The current economic crisis is quite 
dramatic in terms of low prices (see Figure 2) when contrasted with the relatively 
prosperous period from 1975 to 1995—although during that period there were a few 
years with lower prices, including the aftermath of the panic over the use of the chemical 
Alar in 1989.  The market price for apples has been low since the mid 1990s, and per unit 
returns to growers is below cost of production.  The Red Delicious variety epitomizes the 
woes of the industry.  It commands the lowest prices (see Figure 3), even though it is the 
most widely produced and celebrated apple in the Northwest.  Per-capita consumption of 
apples has been flat (see Figure 4).  There is concern in the Northwest apple industry that 
domestic consumption has gone flat because of diminished quality in terms of taste and 
texture.  
  When the eating experience does not meet with expectations, consumers are less 
likely to buy those apples again.  After a bad eating experience, consumers will likely eat 
fewer apples, change varieties, or switch to other types of fruits.  Consistency in quality is 
important because consumers want to be confident of the same eating experience each 
time they buy apples.   In sum, if a subset of producers are selling bad apples, it hurts all 
growers. 
  The “Washington Apple” sticker only signals origin; and it does not reflect 
specific quality or production standards.  Some Washington apple producers use their 
own logos in addition to the “Washington Apple” logo to differentiate their apples.   
Many large packing houses, such as Stemilt Growers, put their own stickers on their   10
apples.  However, the smaller producers, who do not attempt to differentiate their 
product, still have the economic incentive to cut costs by selling lower quality products 
while still benefiting from the collective reputation that Washington has built up over 
time.   
An example of misaligned incentives is the sale of old fruit—last year’s crop—in 
the fresh market.  Apples stored (even in controlled atmospheres) for periods greater than 
nine months can be negatively affected in terms acid loss, sugar development, and loss of 
crispness or firmness (Fellman, 2002).  Collectively, apple growers in Washington should 
want to ban the sales of last year’s crop to consumers who believe they are buying fresh 
apples.  The apple industry got the state legislature to pass a law that generally prohibited 
the sale of last year’s crop after October 1 (Ashton, 2002).  Growers could still sell their 
fruits to juicers and canners but at a much lower price compared to the fresh market.  
Evans Fruit Company, a Yakima, Washington packing house, sued the state Department 
of Agriculture, contending that the law was unconstitutional.  In September 2002, 
Yakima County Superior Court Judge Susan Hahn granted Evans request (Ashton, 2002).  
This example illustrates how individual growers have the incentive to sell their last year’s 
crop as fresh, while the industry as a whole would be better off if the old fruit were 
banned from the fresh market. 
In order to maintain and build on its good reputation, the apple industry in 
Washington should consider establishing minimum standards for what constitutes “eating 
quality” in addition to the normal grading of color, shape, and size.  This suggests that 
reputation should be considered in any cost-benefit analysis for the industry.  Loureiro 
and McCluskey (2000) found that if the protected geographical indications label   11
“Galician Veal” from Spain was present on meat products, Spanish consumers were 
willing to pay a significant premium.  The use of the “Galician Veal” label requires 
producers to be located in the region and also meet very strict quality and production 
practice standards.  The Washington apple industry should follow suit. 
 
5. Conclusions   
Firms who sell a regional or specialty product often share a common or collective 
reputation, which is based on the group's aggregate quality.  Collective reputation should 
be thought of as a common property resource to the group of producers.  If there is more 
than one firm in a producer group, they will produce lower quality and free ride on the 
good group reputation.  We show that when there exists a collective product reputation 
without firm traceability, the firms will extract too much from the stock of reputation.  A 
firm is said to “extract” reputation from the reputation stock when it sells low-quality 
products at high prices given by the high past levels of quality.  The results from this 
work support minimum quality standards for producer groups and regional and specialty 
products.   This is in contrast to the findings of previous work that does not incorporate 
collective reputation. 
 
   12
References 
 
Ashton, L. “State Still May Sell Old Apples after Oct. 1.” Columbian, Vancouver 
Washington (September 25, 2002):C2. 
Allen, F. “Reputation and Product Quality.” Rand Journal of Economics 15(1984):311-
27. 
Bockstael, N.  “The Welfare Implications of Minimum Quality Standards.”  American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 66(1984):466-471. 
Darby, M. and Karni, E. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud." Journal 
of Law and Economics 16 (1973):67 - 88. 
Kamien, I.M. and N. Schwartz.  “Dynamic Optimization.  The Calculus of Variations and 
Optimal Control in Economics and Management.” In Advanced Textbooks in 
Economics, 31.  Editors: C.J. Bliss and M.D. Intriligator (1993). 
Fellman, J. Amicus Brief. Evans v. Washington State Department of Agriculture 2002.  
Karp, L., “Social Welfare in a Common Property Oligopoly,” International Economics 
Review, 33(1992):353-372. 
Kreps, D. and Wilson, R. 1982. Reputation and Imperfect Information. Journal of 
Economic Theory 27: 253-279. 
Levhari, D. and Mirman, L.J.  “The Great Fish War: an Example Using a Dynamic 
Cournot-Nash Solution,” Bell Journal of Economics (1980)11:322-334. 
Loureiro, M.L. and McCluskey, J.J. "Assessing Consumers Response to Protected 
Geographical Identification Labeling." Agribusiness 16(2000): 309-320. 
Mehlmann, Alexander. Applied Differential Games. New York: Plenum Press (1988).   13
Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts. “Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence.” Journal of 
Economic Theory 27(1982):280-312. 
Noe, T.H. and M.J. Rebello, “Consumer Activism, Producer Groups, and Production 
Standards.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 27(1995):69-85. 
Quagrainie, K.K., J.J. McCluskey, and M.L. Loureiro. "A Latent Structure Approach to 
Measuring Reputation." Southern Economic Journal 67(2003):966-977. 
Rogerson, W.P. “Reputation and Product Quality.” The Bell Journal of Economics,” 
14(1983):508-516. 
Shapiro, C. “Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations,” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(1983):659-79. 
Shapiro, C. “Consumer Information, Product Quality, and Seller Reputation,” The Bell 
Journal of Economics, 13(1982):20-35. 
Tirole, J., “A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of 
Corruption and to Firm Quality),” Review of Economic Studies, 63(1996):1-22. 
Zago, A.M. “Quality and Self-Regulation in Agricultural Markets: How do Producer 
Organisations Make the Rules?” European Review of Agricultural Economics 
26(1999):199-218.   14
Endnotes 
1See for example, Kreps and Wilson (1982); Milgrom and Roberts (1982); Shapiro (1982, 
1983); Allen (1984); Rogerson (1983); and Tirole (1996). 
2Credence qualities are expensive to judge even after purchase, (Darby and Karni, p. 69).   15
 
 
Figure 1—Phase Diagram 
 
 
The subscript d denotes the duopoly equilibrium, and the subscript m denotes the 
monopoly equilibrium.  16
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Source: Washington Growers Clearing House Bulletin   17
Figure 3—Washington State Red Delicious per box price history, in actual dollars 
and adjusted for inflation 
Source: Data from Washington Growers Clearing House and Clark Seavert, Oregon State 















































































Source:  USDA/Economic Research Service. 
 
 